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ABSTRACT
In the beginning the World Wide Web, also known as the Internet, consisted mainly of
websites. These were essentially information depositories containing static pages, with
the flow of information mostly one directional, from the server to the user’s browser.
Most of these websites didn’t authenticate users, instead, each user was treated the
same, and presented with the same information. A malicious party that gained access
to the web server hosting these websites would usually not gain access to confidential
information as most of the information on the web server would already be accessible
to the public. Instead, the malicious party would typically modify the files that are on
the server in order to deface the website or use the server to host pirated materials.

At present, the majority of websites available on the public internet are applications;
these are highly functional and rely on two-way communication between the client’s
browser and the web server hosting the application. The content on these applications
is typically generated dynamically, and is often tailored towards each specific user,
with much of the information dealt with being confidential in nature.

A malicious party that compromises a web application, and gains access to confidential
information which they normally should not be able to access, may be able to steal
personal client information, commit financial fraud, or perform other malicious actions
against those users whose personal information has been leaked.

This thesis seeks to examine the access controls that are put in place across a variety of
web applications that seek to prevent malicious parties from gaining access to
confidential information they should not be able to access. It will test these access
controls to ensure that they are robust enough for their purpose, and aims to automate
this procedure.

Key words: Web Application Security, Security Requirements, Access Controls,
Authorisation, Automation
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS
The following is a list of some of the terms that will be used throughout this paper,
along with their meanings:
API – Application Programming Interface is a set of defined interfaces through which
interactions happen between an enterprise and applications which uses its assets.
CSP – Cloud Service Provider is a company that offers network services,
infrastructure, or business applications in the cloud.
SLA – Service Level Agreement is an agreement between a service provider and a
client.
Request – A request is sent whenever a user visits a URL, or performs an action on a
website or web application.
Response – A response is received for every request sent, this contains the data which
was being requested, such as the page being requested in a URL.
URL – Uniform Resource Locator, these are the unique identifiers by which all pages
on a website are known, and through which these pages can be retrieved for viewing.
Method – These are the different ways requests can be sent to interact with a web
server, the two most common are GET, which is designed to retrieve resources from a
web page, and POST which is designed to perform actions on the web server such as
sending a contact us form, or transferring money from one account to the next.
Cookie – Cookies are a piece of data which is given to a client session once they visit a
website or web application, cookies can have many uses such as tracking a user on a
particular website, storing information regarding the session such as a client’s basket
in an online shop, or tracking the session of a user who has logged into the website or
web application.
Header – These are parts of the requests and response which provide both the client
and web server with information about each other.
GUI – Graphical User Interface
JavaScript – JavaScript is a simple programming language which can be used to
extend the functionality of a website or web application.
XML – Extensible Markup Language is a specification for encoding data in a way that
a machine can easily read.
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Proxy – A proxy is a server which mediates access between the client browser and the
web server hosting a web application or website.
Virtual Machine – a virtual machine is an emulation of a computer system, it sits on
top of the normal operating system of a computer, allowing the user to access multiple
different operating systems. For example a Windows machine could run a Linux
virtual machine, or vice versa.
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
Currently, web applications form an incredibly important and crucial part of many
businesses worldwide asset portfolio. The most recent estimates by Internet Live Stats1
are that there is between 1.8 and 1.9 billion live websites, on the internet at the time of
writing.
With the constantly increasing reliance on technology such as, smart phones, mobile
apps and web applications, there has been a change in the attack surface for hackers.
Some of these web and mobile applications handle incredibly valuable data and
important, sensitive information about a company’s clients.
It is due to the sensitive information that they hold, the lack of secure knowledge by
the developers of said applications, and the increased demand for businesses to have an
online presence, which makes websites, and web applications, prime targets for
malicious attackers.
The increased risks has led to the rise of web application security, which is the practice
of discovering, validating and remediating security vulnerabilities and issues within
any given website. This has been strongly championed by the Open Web Application
Security Project (OWASP), a not for profit organisation seeking to improve the state of
web application security worldwide.
In their recent update to the OWASP Top Ten2 – a list of the top ten security risks
faced by a web application, OWASP listed Broken Access Control, as the fifth most
serious risk.
Broken Access Control refers to the improper configuration of restrictions on what
actions authenticated users are allowed to perform. This can allow a malicious user of
the web application access to unauthorised functionality or data, which can include
other users’ personal information; including details such as usernames, passwords, and
bank account or credit card details, among many others.

1

http://www.internetlivestats.com/total-number-of-websites/

2

https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Top_10-2017_Top_10
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As part of a penetration test carried out on a web application by a computer security
expert, the testing for Broken Access Control, more commonly known as authorisation
testing, can be time consuming and repetitive.
There are many ways in which the testing for broken access controls may be done, the
most common of which is to identify application functionality which only certain user
roles should have access to, and then to attempt to access this functionality using a user
role which should not have access, typically through browsing to the URL which hold
the functionality.

1.2 Research Description
The purpose of this project is to examine whether or not the process of performing
authorisation tests – as described above in the background, can be automated, resulting
in an accurate picture of where any possible authorisation issue may occur.
For the purpose of this experiment, three plug-ins for the commercial tool Burp Suite –
which will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 3, were identified that are designed
to aid computer security experts in identifying authorisation vulnerabilities in
authenticated web applications.
In addition to these plug-ins, a custom python script was developed that aims to
automate the testing that the identified plug-ins perform.
Both the custom python script and the identified commercial plug-ins will be used to
test a group of websites for the purpose of finding authorisation vulnerabilities. The
results from both the plug-ins and the custom python script will then be manually
validated by a group of experts, in order to determine how much of the identified
vulnerabilities are real.
The manually validated results will then be compared, in order to determine if the
custom python script – representing the automation of detection for these
vulnerabilities, can provide results which are as accurate as the identified plug-ins –
representing the manual testing for these vulnerabilities.

1.3 Research Objectives
The aim of this experiment can be summarised into the following question:
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Will a custom developed web application scanner, provide a more accurate analysis
than plug-ins developed for commercial grade software in the detection of
authorisation vulnerabilities?
This can be further expanded on by the following statement:
A custom developed web application scanner focused on testing for authorisation
vulnerabilities in web applications, will provide a more accurate (in terms of the
number of false positives – detected vulnerabilities which after review are not real
vulnerabilities, false negatives – vulnerabilities that aren’t detected which after review
are real vulnerabilities, and true positives – detected vulnerabilities which after review
are determined to be real vulnerabilities - of detected authorisation vulnerabilities)
analysis of authorisation vulnerabilities than plug-ins developed for commercial grade
software designed to test for authorisation vulnerabilities (the AuthMatrix, Authz, and
Autorize plug-ins for Burp Suite Pro).

The objectives of this dissertation can be broken down into:
1. Identify other previous work in this area, and determine whether there is a
potential avenue of experimentation, which has not been considered previously.
2. Use the identified plug-ins and the custom python script to identify potential
authorisation vulnerabilities in a group of websites.
3. To manually validate the results of the tools, through the use of experts in the
field of web application security, in order to identify which of the results are
valid authorisation vulnerabilities, and which are in fact false positives.
4. To compare the manually validated results, in order to answer the question
stated above.

1.4 Research Methodologies
There are multiple research methods that will be employed for the duration of this
experiment. Initially a literature review will be performed of the previous research in
this area of study. This will provide an overview of what has previously been done in
this area, as well as identify any possible avenues not followed in previous
experiments.
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The next method which will be employed can be considered Primary Research, instead
of utilising existing data sets in order to perform the experiment, the data sets needed
will be created by achieving the second objective stated above during the experiment.
The results generated during the initial portion of the experiment are considered
quantative in nature, as there will be a large number of detected authorisation
vulnerabilities which are classified as, false positives, true positives, false negatives, or
true negatives.
Finally Empirical Research and Deductive Reasoning will be performed on the
gathered data, in order to determine whether the overall aim of the experiment has
been achieved.

1.5 Scope and Limitations
The literature review which took place was limited to five topics of research, which are
related to, and have some association with the main topic of the experiment.
The web applications – as will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3, was limited to
thirty-five authenticated applications, which were then split further into three
classifications:
1. Applications with known authorisation vulnerabilities
2. Applications which are known to not contain authorisation vulnerabilities
3. Applications where it is unknown whether or not they contain authorisation
vulnerabilities
The identified plug-ins are additions for the popular Burp Suite – a combined web
proxy and web application vulnerability scanner, which are available for both free and
professional versions. The version of Burp Suite which was used for the purposes of
this experiment was the paid professional version.
The custom script was written using python in the PyCharm Python IDE (Integrated
Development Environment), using a student license.

1.6 Document Outline
The dissertation that follows is organised under the following chapters:
Chapter 2 – Literature Review and Related Work
15

This chapter details the initial phase of this experiment, an examination of existing
experiments that cover similar areas of research. These have been broken down into
five topics of research; Information Accountability and Usage Control, Web
Application Security, Web Application Security Requirements, Web Application
Access Control, and finally Web Application Authorisation.
Chapter 3 – Design and Methodology
This chapter details the experiment that was performed, how it was designed as well as
detailing the tools used, and some of the web applications tested during the
experiment.
Chapter 4 – Implementation and Results
This chapter details the implementation of the experiment, how the custom scanner
works, and also providing details regarding the applications where it is unknown if
they contain authorisation vulnerabilities. This chapter will also detail the results
which were retrieved during the course of the experiment.
Chapter 5 – Evaluation, Analysis, and Discussion
This chapter will evaluate, analyse, and discuss the results of the experiment. This will
be done in the context of comparing the results of the tests performed on the vulnerable
web applications, as well as comparing the results of the tests performed on the
applications where it is unknown if they contain vulnerabilities. The overall results
will then be used to compare the different scanning tools that were used in the
experiment: the three plug-ins for the commercial tool – Burp Suite, and the custom
written scanner developed for use in this experiment.
Chapter 6 – Conclusion
The final chapter of the dissertation will contain a brief overview of the experiment to
date, along with any conclusions that that have been reached. This chapter will also
outline recommendations for future work in this area.
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND RELATED WORK
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter an examination will be performed of existing experiments, and research
that was previously performed in this area of research. To further this examination, the
area of research was broken down into five related areas, as follows:
•

Information Accountability and Usage Control
o This portion focuses on one of the rationales behind web application
access control, and the growing relevance of this in the current climate.
Both the upcoming General Data Protection Regulation and the recent
scandal involving Facebook and Cambridge Analytica, highlight the
growing need for strong web application access control

•

Web Application Security
o This portion focuses on providing a general overview of web
application security and its importance, of which access control or
authorisation is large component.

•

Web Application Security Requirements
o This portion discusses the security requirements that web applications
today should be meeting.

•

Web Application Access Control
o This portion discusses web application access control, the different
types, and current flaws in access controls that may provide a malicious
person with the means to recover information which they shouldn’t
have access.

•

Web Application Authorisation
o This portion discusses web application authorisation

2.2 Information Accountability and Usage Control
Accountability can be said to be formed of the procedures and processes which a party
uses to justify and take responsibility for its actions. In terms of information
accountability, this can be interpreted as the users of the information are held liable to
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explain, justify, or answer for their use of information when requested to by the party
that information belongs to (Gajanayake, Iannelle, & Sahama, 2011).
One of the original reasons behind web application access control was to provide a
means of accountability and control over sensitive information, which many web
applications store as a necessary part of their lifecycle about their users. Information
accountability and usage control has grown increasingly relevant in the current
climate, especially following on from the recent Cambridge Analytica controversy, and
from the upcoming General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) which will come into
force from 25th May 2018.

The General Data Protection Regulation or GDPR for short was approved by the
European Union Parliament on 14th April 2016. It was designed to replace the outdated
Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC which was established in 1995, and is intended to
harmonise data privacy levels throughout Europe. The key principles remain the same
between the Data Protection Directive and GDPR;
•

that data is fairly and lawfully process,

•

that it is process for limited purposes,

•

that the data is adequate, relevant, and not excessive

•

that the data is kept accurate

•

that the data is not kept for longer than is required

•

that the data is processed within the client’s rights

•

that the data is kept secure

•

And finally that the data is not transferred to other countries that do not have
adequate protection.

However there are some changes which will be highlighted that will have far reaching
consequences for companies across the globe. Three key changes are in regards to
increased territorial scope, penalties, and consent3. The most significant of these
changes are the increased territorial scope and, regulatory landscape of the regulation.

As part of GDPR all companies processing the personal data of clients residing within
the European Union, regardless of the company’s physical location, are subject to
GDPR. The Data Protection Directive was ambiguous in this regard and the issue arose
3

https://www.eugdpr.org/key-changes.html
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in many high profile court cases. Another key change within the legislation concerns
the penalties which companies failing to comply with GDPR will be hit with. Under
GDPR, an organisation found to be in breach of legislation can be fined up to 4% of
annual global turnover, or €20 million, whichever is found to be higher. Significantly
these penalties apply to both controllers of the personal data, and the processors of it,
meaning that cloud hosting providers will not be exempt from this regulation. The last
key change which will be touched on in this dissertation, is regarding consent. Under
GDPR, informed consent regarding the processing of personal data must be obtained
from all users, as a result data and privacy policy must be easily accessible and
presented in such a manner as to be understood by the average user. Each user must
also be able to easily withdraw consent at any time.

A key aspect in ensuring that a company is complying with the incoming rules under
GDPR is enacting proper access control mechanisms in regards to client information.
It is important for security and data protection that only company officers who need
access to client data have this access and ensuring that they only have access to the
personal data of clients needed for their job.

Pato, Paradesi, Jacobi, Shih, & Wang (2011) state that access controls models falls
short in two ways when dealing with potential damage from information leakage.
These two ways are:
1. It relies on the ability to anticipate who should have access
2. It assumes that an authorised user will make appropriate and compliant use of
the information.
The second of these short comings can be seen in the recent Cambridge Analytica
controversy, wherein they were given access through Facebook to the personally
identifiable information of up to 87 million Facebook users4. This data was then
allegedly used to influence voting opinions in the countries of politicians that hired
Cambridge Analytica5.
4

https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/apr/04/facebook-cambridge-

analytica-user-data-latest-more-than-thought
5

https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/mar/19/cambridge-analytica-execs-

boast-dirty-tricks-honey-traps-elections
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There has recently been a worrying trend of large data breaches being disclosed, from
the recent Yahoo security breaches which occurred in 2013 and 2014 but were not
publicly disclosed until 2016, to the recent Verizon breach which occurred in 2017,
more and more companies are being attacked by malicious users. In fact this problem
has been ongoing for the last eleven years, as can be seen in the 2007 paper
Information Accountability, in it the author Daniel Weitzner states that disclosure of
sensitive personal data, revelation of corporate secrets, distribution of copyrighted
material, the sharing of confidential records among organizations in violation of
regulation and policy, are the kind of breaches of established social norms and laws
that are now considered to have become a part of everyday life. (Weitzner, et al., 2007)

2.3 Web Application Security
With web applications, and indeed mobile applications, becoming ever increasingly
integrated into the daily activities of the typical internet user, the security of these
applications has increased in importance as well. As far back as 2008, the trend of an
increasing reliance on web applications was noticed, as can be seen in the 2008 paper
Dynamic Test Input Generation for Web Applications, wherein the author Gary
Wasserman states that web applications continue to offer more features, handle more
sensitive data, and generate content dynamically based on more sources as users
increasingly rely on them for daily activities. (Wasserman, Yu, Dhurjati, Inamura, &
Su, 2008)

Additional challenges have also been introduced to web applications, through the
proliferation of cloud computing among modern web applications. Cloud computing
brings with it its own unique challenges, which in their 2012 paper State-of-the-art
Cloud Computing Security Taxonomies - A classification of security challenges in the
present cloud computing environment (Srinivasan, Sarukesi, Rodrigues, M, & P, 2012)
the authors split into two categories: Architectural and Technological aspects, and
Process and regulatory related aspects. The challenges associated with the architectural
and technological aspects of cloud computing includes: logical storage segregation and
multi-tenancy security issues,

identity management

issues,

insider

attacks,

virtualisation attacks, and cryptography and key management. While similarly the
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challenges associated with the process and regulatory aspects of cloud computing
includes: governance and regulatory compliance gaps, insecure APIs, cloud and CSP
migration issues, and SLA and trust management gaps.

Alongside the growing reliance on web applications on the public internet, web
applications have also been widely adopted inside organisations to support important
functions. Many of these functions give the web application access to highly sensitive
data, examples of which are:
•

Human resources applications
o Applications included in this classification can have access to
information such as payroll information, employee performance
feedback, recruitment information such as applicant’s CVs, and even
disciplinary information.

•

Administrative interfaces
o Applications included in this classification can have access to important
infrastructure which the company uses, such as web and mail servers,
and user workstations.

•

Collaborative software
o Applications included in this classification can have access to internal
documents, can be used to manage internal workflow and projects, and
can also be used to track issues internally.

•

Business applications
o Applications included in this classification such as enterprise resource
planning software were previously developed as thick client
applications – applications which work exclusively on the client
machine with little interaction with the server, but have now been
moving more towards access through a web browser.

•

Software services
o Applications included in this classification can include e-mail clients

•

Traditional desktop applications
o Applications included in this classification can include applications
such as word processors or spreadsheet processors, which are also
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seeing a migration to the web browser through applications such as
Google Docs, and Microsoft Office 365.

However despite all this organisations continue to be unprepared for the threat that
exists to their systems. In the 2013 CREST Penetration Test Procurement Buyers
Guide (Creasey & Glover, 2013) the authors state that organisations often suffer from
a lack of budget, resources, technology, or recognition of the type and magnitude of
the problem. They also state that they don’t have the software, testing, process,
technology, or people to handle sophisticated cyber security threats.

In their 2014 paper An Automated Approach to Vulnerability Assessment and
Penetration Testing using Net-Nirikshak 1.0 (Shah & Mehtre, 2014, p. 707) the authors
state that “identification of vulnerabilities and remediation of the same has become one
of the prime concerns of every web facing organisation in the last few decades.”

This can be seen further in the 2014 paper A Survey and Vital Analysis of Various State
of the Art Solutions for Web Application Security (Thankachan, Ramakrishnan, &
Kalaiarasi, 2014) where the authors state that “a high percentage of web applications
deployed on the internet are exposed to security vulnerabilities”. This is further back
up by the Verizon 2017 Data Breach Investigations Report (Verizon, 2017, p. 24),
where they found that “almost 60% of breaches involved web applications either as
the asset affected, and/ or a vector to the affected asset.”

To combat the rising threats to web applications, and the organisations to which they
belong, a form of testing called penetration testing (informally known as pen testing) is
performed. This form of testing is perhaps best defined in the 2016 paper Manual and
Automated Penetration Testing. Benefits and Drawbacks. Modern Tendency (Stefinko,
Piskozub, & Banakh, 2016, p. 488) where they define it as “pen testing is used to
search for vulnerabilities that might exist in a system. The goal of a penetration test is
to increase data security.” They also state that the attacks performed in a penetration
test “probe a system’s defences, these defences are then breached to evaluate the
impact of any weaknesses, the results of these tests are used to improve a system’s
security, making them resilient to further attacks.”
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There are three types of penetration tests that can be performed, white hat, black hat,
and grey hat. White hat is where the test is performed with full co-operation from the
target network, and sometimes includes access to the source code. Black hat is where
the test is performed with only a few administrators knowing that the test is underway,
this allows for a simulation of a real world attack, wherein the defenders can learn how
their internal security incident response performs. Finally grey hat is a combination of
both white and black hat testing. However, in their 2015 paper Penetration Testing
Automation Assessment Method Based on Rule Tree (Zhao, Shang, Wan, & Zeng,
2015, p. 1829) the authors state that “Penetration testing requires higher confrontation
and customization generally, and penetration test team needs analyse constantly in
penetration process. But many penetration testing tools can`t be used automatically,
and it is difficult to develop with other different commercial software.”
In 2008 the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) proposed a
four stage penetration testing model which consisted of planning, discovery, attack,
and reposting. This model has gone on to become the basis for penetration tests
performed globally.

Figure 1 - Penetration Testing Model as proposed by NIST (NIST, 2008)

There are many reasons for penetration testing to be performed, some of the main
reasons include: security issues – to identify any potential vulnerabilities before they
can be used against the organisation or their systems, to protect information – with
constant new attacks being developed to take advantage of vulnerabilities it’s become
increasingly difficult to protect a user’s information, to prioritise security risks – issues
identified during the penetration test can be prioritised based on the severity of the
identified issue, and to secure against financial loss – they can help prevent or reduce
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fines and lawsuits resulting from security malpractices - particularly with the incoming
GDPR regulations.

2.4 Web Application Security Requirements
Security requirements for web applications can be derived from some of the basic
tenants of web application security:
•

Know the players – know who is logged into the application at any given time,
and ensure that those who are logged in should have access

•

Maintain confidentiality – this can be done through what is known as end to
end encryption, no decryption or payload inspection while the data is in transit
from client machines to the server

•

Separate access and privilege from identity – associate the what access and
privilege a user has in the web application to a role, instead of directly
associating them to the user

•

Maintain integrity – knowing that what you receive at any given moment is
exactly what was sent

•

Require explicit integrity – monitoring and logging all transactions done
through the web application

There are however many different opinions on the security requirements which a web
application should meet, but as stated in the 2015 paper Analysis of Key Critical
Requirements for Enhancing Security of Web Applications (Kumar, 2015) they can be
reduced down to nine key requirements. These nine requirements include: recognise
and overthrow encrypted application attacks, observe all application communications,
scrutinise and defeat zero-day attacks, adapt and implement policies for dynamic
application environments, comprehensively screen application infrastructure elements,
properly inspect benign traffic, install consistent security for all security sensitive
applications, prevent the leakage of sensitive data related to stakeholders –
stakeholders in this instance refers to anyone with an involvement with the application
including any users, and secure infrastructure and protect the application users.
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Similarly the 2016 paper A Hybrid Threat Model for Software Security Requirement
Specification (Omotunde & Ibrahim, 2016) recommends some steps to take to secure a
web application, this includes: changing GET methods to POST during client server
interactions, use of parameterised statements instead of dynamically generated queries,
server side validation of user input, zero level trust for all user input, use of the
principle of least privilege, and the use of a white list – a list of allowed inputs for
parameters.

Variations of these requirements have been stated at various times over the past
decades since the public internet became so widely accessible. In their 2008 paper
Eliciting Security Requirements through Misuse Activities

(Braz, Fernandez, &

VanHilst, 2008), the authors say that security is a matter of constraints, but in many
others security is a more general need, and therefore it cannot be treated as a simple set
of restrictions. They also say that typically, systems need some combination of
authentication, authorization, transaction integrity, accountability, and message
secrecy.

This is also visible in Authorization and Privacy for Semantic Web Services (Kagal, et
al., 2004) where the authors describe authorization policies, as policies that constrain
the provider to only accept requests for service from certain clients.

A paper back in 2011 (Kumar, Mitigating the Authentication Vulnerabilities in Web
Applications through Security Requirements, 2011) stated that many organisations
invested considerable resources to safeguard system security but are unprotected
against security attacks. This may be due to a reliance on firewalls, network intrusion
detection and prevention software, anti-virus software, anti-spyware, and Secure
Sockets Layer or SSL in shorthand. However while these are critical systems to ensure
the security of an organisation, they are no longer enough.

Additionally new challenges arise when attempting to meet requirement such as these,
including the popularity of multi-tenancy in cloud computing service providers for
example – where in a single instance of software runs on a server and serves multiple
tenants, these tenants are groups of users who share a common access with specific
privileges to the software instance running on the server. While multi-tenancy can help
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improve quality of service, and help reduce service customisation and maintenance
time, it invites additional challenges to securing these tenants. A part of this arises
from each tenant potentially needing different security requirements, this means that
the service provider needs to comply with each tenant’s requirements, while at the
same time ensuring that it remains compatible with the other tenants using the
application (Alqahtani, He, & Gamble, 2017).

To understand the need for security for an application six questions can be asked
(Assad, Tarciana, Ferraz, Ferreira, & Meira, 2010), these questions include:
1. What are the common security requirements for web applications?
2. What are the vulnerabilities found on each requirement?
3. What are the solution methods available?
4. What action is to be taken to mitigate?
5. What programming language will be used?
6. What are the impacts of the action in terms of architectural choices,
frameworks and components?

2.5 Web Application Access Control
There are many different definitions for access control, with perhaps the best and most
clear definition given in the 2011 paper Access Control of Web and Java Based
Applications (Tso, Pajevski, & Brian, 2011) as seeking “to restrict access to protected
resources by enforcing policies that state which subjects can perform which actions
under which circumstances on which resources.” This paper also state that it works on
a number of levels including hardware, operating system, middleware, and application.

Access control is normally required to provide four main functions (Afolaranmi, et al.,
2017), namely identification, authentication, authorisation, and accountability. These
functions are further expanded on below:
•

Identification – The process where the user selects an identity or a tag, typically
in the form of a username, by which they will be known by the access control
model.
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•

Authentication – This extends the previous function, by verifying the identity
of the user. This normally involves the use of a password or a personal
identification number.

•

Authorisation – This function follows on from the authentication function,
where by the access control model grants the user its rights to the
corresponding application resources and functionality.

•

Accountability – This incorporates all three previous functions and ensures that
every activity in accessing resources or functionality is closely tracked and
monitored, to ensure that only those authorised have gained access.

There are many different models which can be used as a basis for implementation of
access controls in a web application. These models include, but are not limited to,
Discretionary Access Control, Role Based Access Control, Attribute Based Access
Control, and Emotion Based Access Control. These models are described best in the
2016 paper Hybrid Authentication and Authorization Model for Web based
Applications (Indu & Rubesh Anand, 2016) where they describe Discretionary Access
Control or DAC in short hand, as being based around an employee’s identity and
membership of certain user groups. They also state that this is typically based around
Windows Active Directory. Role Based Access Control or RBAC in short hand, is
based on different levels of authorisation controlled by a set of pre-defined of access
privilege rules or application roles, these are normally associated with each user
identity and is stored in the application database. Finally, they describe Attribute Based
Access Control or ABAC in short hand, as taking into consideration user attributes,
resource attributes, environmental conditions, and organisation policies to determine
the user access privilege. Emotion Based Access Control or EBAC in short hand was
first described in the 2012 paper Authorized! Access Denied, Unauthorized! Access
Granted (Almehmadi & El-Khatib, 2013), where the authors describe this method as
being based on the non-invasive acquisition of users’ physiological signals, which the
system then bases the decision to allow access to the application on.

However, the current popularity of social media has increased the complexity of
implementing access controls in these applications. There are two main obstacles for
implementing access controls for social media, first the diversity of the user base and
the subsequent diversity of data contributed to the application from these users.
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Second, that there still exists a large disparity between a user’s mental model of the
access controls provided by the application, and the current access control models used
by the application (Singh, 2012).

Implementation of access controls in web applications is further complicated with the
growing popularity of web application frameworks such as Ruby on Rails and Django.
These frameworks increase programmer productivity and also help to prevent common
errors in design and implementation. However Ruby on Rails doesn’t implement
access control mechanisms, instead it depends on third party libraries called gems, or
the developer can implement it ad-hoc into their applications. A 2016 paper found
numerous access control flaws in web applications developed using Ruby on Rails,
which implemented one of these third-party libraries (Bocic & Bultan, 2016).

There are various types of authorisation flaws that derive from the above models, as
seen in the 2011 paper Detecting Insufficient Access Control in Web Applications
(Noseevich & Petukhov, 2011)

where the authors identify three types of access

control flaws, based on their root cause, which are as follows:
1. Privileges under user control – when the application makes assumptions about
a user’s privileges based on invalidated input
2. Missing access control list entry – when the application wide access control is
implemented by use of a blacklist, missing entries will normally create
authorisation vulnerabilities
3. Insufficient access control on certain execution paths

These flaws were at one stage quite common in web applications. In their 2011 book
The Web Application Hackers Handbook Second Edition (Stuttard & Pinto, 2011) the
authors state that between 2007 and 2011 they performed penetration tests on hundreds
of web applications, and out of all these web applications 71% of web applications
tested contained broken access controls. The authors also identify what they believe
are the three main types of attacks which are used against access controls, which can
be broken down into the following three categories:
•

Vertical privilege escalation – This occurs when a user can perform functions
which their assigned role should not allow. For example, a normal user
accessing the administrator functionality to add a new user account.
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•

Horizontal privilege escalation – This occurs when a user can view or modify
resources which they should not be able to. For example, viewing another
user’s emails.

•

Business logic exploitation – This occurs when a user can exploit a flaw in the
application’s state machine to gain access to a resource which they normally
shouldn’t.

It is also not uncommon for these vulnerabilities to lead from one into another, for
example a horizontal privilege escalation results in the malicious entity being able to
launch a vertical privilege escalation attack.

The abundance of these vulnerabilities can be attributed to the fact that, as stated by
the authors of the 2016 paper Toward Exploiting Access Control Vulnerabilities within
MongoDB Backend Web Applications (Wen, et al., 2016, p. 143) “correct
implementation of access control within a web application is non-trivial, since all
feasible privileges of roles and users have to be thoroughly evaluated against the
complex data models at the backend database.”

The modern environment with the incoming GDPR and the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) for healthcare companies and institutions
and Gramm Leach Bliley Act (GLBA) for financial institutions in the United States
highlights the growing need for secure access control to be implemented, in order to
ensure that only authorised parties can access the sensitive information. In 2010 the
authors of Privacy-aware Role Based Access Control (Ni, et al., 2010) state that
privacy has been acknowledged to be a critical requirement for many business (and
non-business) environments. They also state that legislative acts require enterprises to
protect the privacy of their customers. In this they are referring to the private personal
information which a customer would give to the organisation, trusting that only
authorised users could access it.

2.6 Web Application Authorisation
Most modern web applications protect content from those unauthorised to access it,
whether that is done by authentication or access authorisation. Web applications
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currently use authentication techniques to validate and verify a user’s identity; this
often takes the form of a username and password. An alternative is to use an identity
provider such as Shibboleth, Microsoft Passport, or Google Accounts. However this
raises other problems, in the 2010 paper DAuth: Fine-grained Authorization
Delegation for Distributed Web Application Consumers (Schiffman, Zhang, & Gibbs,
2010) the authors state that while these methods are effective for identifying users,
they are less useful for applications working on their behalf. They also state that
providing third party applications with login credentials raises the risk of identity theft
through leaked secrets, and an increased attack surface for a malicious party.

This can be seen further in The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework (Hardt, 2012),
where the creator of the framework Hardt states that in order to provide third-party
applications access to restricted resources, the resource owner shares its credentials
with the third party. He further goes on to state that this creates several problems,
revolving around the need for the third-party application to store and use the
credentials of the resource owner.
These problems aren’t limited to traditional web applications but can also affect cloud
applications. Bernd Grobauer et al (Grobauer, Walloschek, & Stocker, 2010) states in
their 2010 paper that unauthorized access to the management interface is an especially
relevant vulnerability for cloud systems: the probability that unauthorized access could
occur is much higher than for traditional systems where the management functionality
is accessible only to a few administrators.

In the 2017 White Hat Application Security Statistics Report (WhiteHat Security,
2017) they report that information leakage – of which authorisation vulnerabilities are
one of the main root causes, is the most prevalent vulnerability with 37 percent
likelihood. This is even more damning, when compared with one of the most common
vulnerabilities that exists today Cross-Site Scripting, which has a likelihood of 33
percent. However, they further state that insufficient authorisation vulnerabilities only
have an 8 percent likelihood of happening. They break this down even further by
comparing the most serious vulnerabilities, such as SQL Injection, Cross-Site
Scripting, Cross-Site Request Forgery, among others. When compared to these
vulnerabilities, authorisation vulnerabilities can be seen in a new light. SQL Injection
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was found to of a critical risk 94 percent of the time it’s detected, while Cross-Site
Scripting was only found to be of a critical risk 38 percent of the time it’s detected. In
comparison to this insufficient authorisation vulnerabilities, were found to be of a
critical risk 40 percent of the times it was found to be present in an application.
Furthermore, WhiteHat analysed the remediation rates of these vulnerabilities, or in
other words the rate at which these vulnerabilities are fixed and found that only
approximately 40 percent of insufficient authorisation vulnerabilities that were
detected during 2016 were fixed.

One of the causes of this type of vulnerability lies in the higher privilege level which
most web applications run at on the server, compared to the individual users who may
be using the web application. This means that the developers must implement their
own checks into the web application to enforce the authorisation levels of any given
user. However, this can be problematic for developers, as a single missed check could
result in unauthorised access. In addition to this most developers focus on the
components that they themselves have written, however in the 2015 paper
FlowWatcher: Defending against Data Disclosure Vulnerabilities in Web Applications
(Muthukumaran, et al., 2015) the authors state that missing checks often exist in third
party plug-ins and extensions. They further state that in 2013 16 percent of security
bugs reported in CVE - Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures a repository of all
publicly known vulnerabilities - for Drupal were related to unauthorised data
disclosure in plug-ins.
The continued rise of social network web applications in today’s markets clearly
demonstrates the complexity and challenge that modern developers face when
implementing authorisation and access control in modern web applications. Social
network applications are constantly growing, adding more and more features, often in
a form of arms race with each other to attract new users and keep existing ones. These
new features involve improving experiences when using the application, and including
more ways to express oneself, which often means new ways of interacting with other
users. The complexity associated with these applications could perhaps best be
described by examining common features, such as messaging – either one to one or
group. In this situation only, the participant should be able to send and receive
messages associated with the conversation, and only participants should be able to add
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new people to the conversation. In addition to this, messages can be edited for a short
time after they’ve been sent, but this can only be done by the user that sent the
message. Another common feature involves a user posting content to their personal
page, which is usually unrestricted, or posting content to a group – commonly only
after being accepted into that group. There is also a way to create connections with
other users, and in doing so opens even more features and ways to interact. Failure to
properly implement authorisation checks for any one of these features mentioned
above can lead to irreparable reputational data for the organisation, and on a personal
level for the affected user – this could include serious life altering event such as loss of
family, employment, and could even in some case lead to identity theft.

This has led to challenges (Marinescu, et al., 2017) which could be considered unique
to social network web applications. Some of these challenges stem from the daily
operations which the application must perform; many of the popular social networks
have over 100 million active users, while an estimated 1.8 billion people have a social
network account. This results in a large number of requests which need to be checked
in real-time and is further complicated by the interconnected nature of the data being
requested. This scale of request also impacts on the number of acceptable false
positive, which may arise from authorisation checks, even a rate as low as 0.00001
percent can be considered unacceptable, due to the large number of users which would
be affected, and the alarms that would be generated requiring human validation. Some
of the other challenges are derived from the complicated nature of the code base
required to operate a social network application.

2.7 Conclusion
In this chapter a range of literature related to web application authorisation was
explored. The literature explored was broken down into five different topics, each of
which are associated with, and have an impact on web application authorisation. These
topics were information accountability and usage control, web application security,
web application security requirements, web application access control, and finally web
application authorisation itself.
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Information accountability and usage control was explored in order to provide some
background about the need for strong authorisation in web applications, and its
importance in today’s environment with legislation such as GDPR coming into
enforcement.
Web application security and web application security requirements were explored due
to the large role that authorisation plays in securing web applications. This also
demonstrated the importance of secure web applications, and how that the level of
security implemented in web applications, though improving, still leaves a lot to be
desired.
Web application access control and web application authorisation were explored, in
order to explain how access control and authorisation works, while at the same time
displaying the complexities of these systems and how a malicious entity can exploit
them.
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3. DESIGN AND METHODOLO GY
3.1 Introduction
Following on from the review of the current related literature in the previous chapter,
this chapter will focus on the presenting an outline of the experiment which was
performed, and the technologies involved. This will be done under the following
topics: experiment overview, technologies used, and experiment design. The
experiment overview provides a brief examination of the experiment that was
performed. Technologies used provide an introduction and brief overview of the
technologies used including those used in the creation of the custom written scanner, a
brief introduction and overview of the commercial tool and its plug-ins, and a brief
overview of the vulnerable web application which were tested as part of the
experiment.

3.2 Experiment Overview
The key objective of this experiment was to show that the task of performing
authorisation testing on authenticated web applications can be automated, without the
use of access control models, machine learning algorithms, or access to the source
code of the application. In order to achieve this objective, various ways of performing
authorisation testing was examined, with two key methods being chosen for
examination. These two methods are as follows: one, to test the applications by
attempting to directly browse to web application functionality in the browser, and two,
to test the applications by proxying the browser through a web application proxy tool,
in order to modify the cookies and/or headers.

For the purposes of the experiment it was decided to write a custom script that would
automate manual testing of authenticated web applications through the browsers. As
well as this it was decided to pick three plug-ins for a commercial grade web
application vulnerability scanner, which would perform the modification of cookies
and/or headers testing. These would then be run against a number of web applications,
which were divided into three categories: those with known authorisation
vulnerabilities, those that are known to have no authorisation vulnerabilities and finally
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those where it’s unknown whether or not they have vulnerabilities. Once these web
applications are finished being tested the results will be examined by a group of
information security experts, who will validate whether any detected issues are real or
whether they are false positives.

These results will then feed back into the overall hypothesis of the experiment, that
being that a custom developed web application scanner focused on testing for
authorisation vulnerabilities in web applications, will provide a more accurate (in
terms of the number of false positives, false negatives, and true positives of detected
authorisation vulnerabilities) analysis of authorisation vulnerabilities than plug-ins
developed for commercial grade software designed to test for authorisation
vulnerabilities.

3.3 Technologies Used
Over the course of the experiment there were a number of technologies used; these
technologies include those used for the creation of the custom written scanner, the
commercial tool and its plug-ins, and the vulnerable web applications that will be
tested as part of the experiment. These technologies are explained in further detail
below.
3.3.1 Developed Scanner
There were two technologies used for the development of the custom scanner, these
being Python and Selenium. Both of these technologies are discussed below.
3.3.1.1 Python
Python is a widely used high level programming language-one with a large amount of
abstraction from code that the machine understands; they use natural language
elements to make the coding of a program easier for the developer. Python follows a
philosophy of emphasising code readability and allows a programmer to develop their
code in fewer lines than it would take in other languages.
Python supports many programming features including object oriented, dynamic
typing, and automatic memory management and has a large set of libraries for many
different uses. It comes pre-installed on Linux distributions, but needs to be
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downloaded and installed for Windows. Python files do not need to be compiled but
can be run immediately after being coded. It is also a free open source programming
language.
3.3.1.2 Selenium
Selenium is a software testing framework for web applications; it also provides a
domain-specific language known as Selenese that allows for tests to be written in a
variety of popular programming languages. These tests can then be run using most
modern browsers. It consists of two main parts: one, a complete integrated
development environment that allows for the recording, editing, and debugging of
tests. This is normally implemented as a browser add-on for either Firefox or Chrome.
Scripts can be recorded and edited manually, and are generally stored as Selenese
commands, which translate as commands for a browser. For example, a script may tell
the browser to go to a certain website page, click the link to log in, enter the username
and password, and then click the login button.

The second part, known as WebDriver, accepts commands which have been sent in
Selenese or through the client API and sends them to the browser. This is done through
a browser specific driver – e.g. a separate driver is needed for Chrome or Firefox,
which sends the command to that browser and retrieves the results. Most of these
drivers will launch an instance of the browser in question; browsers included are
Chrome, Firefox, Safari, Microsoft Edge, Internet Explorer, and headless browsers
such as PhantomJS. A client API is included in Selenium to allow tests be written in
other programming languages, such as Java, Python, JavaScript, C#, or Ruby on Rails.
3.3.2 Burp Suite
Burp Suite6 is a graphical tool written in Java for testing web applications. It comes in
two versions; community edition available for free, which contains a stripped-down
version with less features, or the professional version available for a yearly fee which
contains all available features. The features which come with the professional version
include: HTTP proxy – a web proxy server which sits between the browser and
destination web servers allowing for the interception and modification of raw traffic,
6

https://portswigger.net/burp
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scanner – a web application vulnerability scanner allowing for the automated scanning
of requests for vulnerabilities, intruder – can be used to automate web application
attacks through either a user generated or provided list of vectors, spider – automates
the crawling of a web site, repeater – allows for the manual modification of requests
and provides the ability to resend these modified requests and view the responses,
decoder – a tool for either encoding or decoding information, comparer – a comparison
tool for viewing the differences between two requests/responses, extender – allows for
new user created or third party created functionality to be added, and sequencer –
analyses the randomness in a sample of data, this can be used to test the randomness of
tokens such as session cookies or anti-CSRF tokens. Cross-Site Request Forgery or
CSRF for short occurs when a malicious entity forces an end user of an application to
execute unwanted actions on a web application in which they are currently
authenticated. These attacks typically target state changing requests, such as changing
account details, or transferring money from one account to another. One of the ways to
defend against this kind of attack is to make use of anti-CSRF tokens, these are values
added to either the request body, or as a header.
There are three plug-ins that can be added through the extender, which are of particular
interest for the purpose of this experiment: AuthMatrix, Authz, and Autorize.
3.3.2.1 AuthMatrix
The below figure shows AuthMatrix7, an extension for Burp Suite, which is designed
to improve the process of verifying authorisation policies in web applications and
services. It allows testers to define a set of roles, users, and requests that satisfactorily
covers the capabilities of the target application. These are displayed in a table that is in
a similar format to an access control matrix that’s commonly found in various threat
modelling methodologies. Testers can then just click one button, and the extension will
test all combinations of roles and requests. The results are then displayed back in an
easy to read colour coded interface indicating any possible authorisation vulnerabilities
detected.

7

https://portswigger.net/bappstore/30d8ee9f40c041b0bfec67441aad158e
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Figure 2 - Screenshot of AuthMatrix

3.3.2.1 Authz

Figure 3 - Screenshot of Authz
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The above screenshot shows Authz8, an extension for Burp Suite, which is designed to
help the pen tester performing authorisation testing. Testers can send requests to it,
create a new cookie – presumably that of a different user, and send the requests with
the created cookie. The extension then notes whether there is a difference in the
responses, between the original response, and the modified response.

3.3.2.1 Authorize

Figure 4 - Screenshot of Authorize

The above screenshot shows Authorize9, an extension for Burp Suite, which attempts
to automate the detection of authorisation enforcement. Testers can set the cookies and
other potential authorisation headers which they want to use in the extension, and then
turn it on. The extension works in the background while the tester is navigating the
target application, recording requests sent, and repeating them with the specified
cookies and headers.
3.3.3 Vulnerable Web Applications
As part of the experiment vulnerable web applications were tested, in an attempt to
discern whether or not the custom written script or the plug-ins for Burp Suite could
detect authorisation vulnerabilities. The vulnerable web applications were selected on
the basis of whether or not they had authorisation vulnerabilities and are described in
more detail below.

8

https://portswigger.net/bappstore/4316cc18ac5f434884b2089831c7d19e

9

https://portswigger.net/bappstore/f9bbac8c4acf4aefa4d7dc92a991af2f
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3.3.3.1 HacMe Bank
The below screenshot shows HacMe Bank, a vulnerable web application designed to
teach application developers, programmers, architects and security professionals how
to create a secure web application. It simulates an online banking application, with a
number of known vulnerabilities. The purpose is to allow users to test the exploitation
of vulnerabilities in a safe and secure manner, and thus learn the specifics and how
best to remediate any such vulnerability. The application is designed to work with
Windows .NET Framework, and Microsoft SQL Server. For the purposes of this
experiment, this application was run using Microsoft Internet Information Services
(IIS) version 7, and was hosted in a virtual machine running windows 7 using
VirtualBox – a program designed to manage and operate virtual machines. The
vulnerabilities coded into it include, but are not limited to:
•

SQL Injection

•

Cross-Site Scripting

•

Horizontal Privilege Escalation

•

Vertical Privilege Escalation

•

Directory Listing

•

Session Hijacking

•

Cookie Manipulation

Figure 5 - Screenshot of HacMe Bank
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3.3.3.2 OWASP WebGoat
The below screenshot shows OWASP WebGoat, a vulnerable web application,
designed and maintained by the Open Web Application Security Project (or OWASP
for short). The purpose is to allow users to test the exploitation of vulnerabilities in a
safe and secure manner, and thus learn the specifics and how best to remediate any
such vulnerability. This application is one of many included in the OWASP Broken
Web Application virtual machine, a UNIX based operating system hosting a number of
vulnerable web applications, this virtual machine was used to host the application for
the purposes of this experiment using VirtualBox – a program designed to manage and
operate virtual machines. The vulnerabilities coded into it include, but are not limited
to:
•

Cross-Site Scripting

•

Insufficient Access Control

•

Thread Safety

•

Hidden Form Manipulation

•

Parameter Manipulation

•

Weak Session Cookies

•

SQL Injection

Figure 6 - Screenshot of OWASP WebGoat
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3.3.3.3 OWASP Juice Shop
The below screenshot shows OWASP Juice Shop, a vulnerable web application,
written in NodeJS, Express and AngularJS. The purpose is to allow users to test the
exploitation of vulnerabilities in a safe and secure manner, and thus learn the specifics
and how best to remediate any such vulnerability, while also allowing web application
vulnerability scanners to test how well they cope with a JavaScript heavy application
frontend and REST API backend. This application is hosted publicly, and is available
at the following URL https://juice-shop.herokuapp.com. The vulnerabilities coded into
it include, but are not limited to:
•

Broken Authentication

•

XML External Entities Injection

•

Cross-Site Scripting

•

Broken Access Control

•

Insecure Deserialization

•

SQL Injection

Figure 7 - Screenshot of OWASP Juice Shop

3.3.3.4 Pentester Lab 2
The below screenshot shows Pentester Lab 2, a vulnerable web application. The
purpose is to allow users to test the exploitation of vulnerabilities in a safe and secure
manner, and thus learn the specifics and how best to remediate any such vulnerability.
42

This application can be downloaded as an iso file, which can then be used to run a live
USB. For the purposes of this experiment, this application was run from the iso file on
a virtual machine using VirtualBox – a program designed to manage and operate
virtual machines. The vulnerabilities coded into it include, but are not limited to:
•

SQL Injection

•

Broken Authorisation

•

Broken Authentication

•

Insecure Captcha

Figure 8 - Screenshot of Pentester Lab 2

3.3.3.5 Damn Vulnerable Web App
The below screenshot shows Damn Vulnerable Web App, a vulnerable web
application, written in php and MySQL. The purpose is to allow users to test the
exploitation of vulnerabilities in a safe and secure manner, and thus learn the specifics
and how best to remediate any such vulnerability. This application is one of many
included in the OWASP Broken Web Application virtual machine, a UNIX based
operating system hosting a number of vulnerable web applications, this virtual
machine was used to host the application for the purposes of this experiment using
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VirtualBox – a program designed to manage and operate virtual machines. The
vulnerabilities coded into it include, but are not limited to:
•

Brute Force Login

•

Command Execution

•

Insecure Captcha

•

Cross-Site Scripting

•

File Inclusion

•

SQL Injection

Figure 9 – Screenshot of DVWA

3.3.3.6 Bwapp
Bwapp is a free and open source deliberately insecure web application, developed in
PHP and MySQL. It is designed to help security enthusiasts, developers and students
to discover and to prevent web vulnerabilities. This application is one of many
included in the OWASP Broken Web Application virtual machine, a UNIX based
operating system hosting a number of vulnerable web applications, this virtual
machine was used to host the application for the purposes of this experiment using
VirtualBox – a program designed to manage and operate virtual machines. The
vulnerabilities coded into it include, among many others:
•

SQL Injection

•

OS Command Injection

•

Cross-Site Scripting
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•

Cross-Site Request Forgery

•

Broken authentication and authorisation

•

XML External Entity attacks

Figure 10 – Screenshot of Bwapp

3.3.3.7 Altoro Mutual

Figure 11 – Screenshot of Altoro Mutual

Altoro mutual, seen in the screenshot above, is a vulnerable web application, created
by WatchFire – now owned by IBM – as a demo application for their black box
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scanner. This application is publicly hosted, and is available at the following URL
http://testfire.net/. The vulnerabilities coded into it include, among many others:
•

SQL Injection

•

Cross-Site Scripting

•

Directory Listing

•

Cross-Site Request Forgery

3.3.3.8 Mutillidae 2

Figure 12 - Screenshot of Mutillidae

Mutillidae 2, as seen in the screenshot above, is a vulnerable web application, and has
been created to include vulnerabilities from multiple versions of the OWASP Top Ten.
It has been used for multiple different purposes, including: graduate security courses,
corporate training, an “assess the assessor” target – wherein the client provides the
prospective penetration testing team with a vulnerable web application in an effort to
test the effectiveness of the team, and as a target for web application firewall testing.
This application is one of many included in the OWASP Broken Web Application
virtual machine, a UNIX based operating system hosting a number of vulnerable web
applications, this virtual machine was used to host the application for the purposes of
this experiment using VirtualBox – a program designed to manage and operate virtual
machines. The following vulnerabilities are among the many that are coded into it:
•

SQL Injection

•

Cross-Site Scripting
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•

Privilege Escalation

•

XML External Entity Injection

•

Remote File Inclusion

•

Cross-Site Request Forgery

•

Broken Authorisation

3.3.3.9 OWASP Bricks
OWASP Bricks is a deliberately insecure web application, written in PHP and
MySQL, and maintained by the Open Web Application Security Project (or OWASP
for short). This application is one of many included in the OWASP Broken Web
Application virtual machine, a UNIX based operating system hosting a number of
vulnerable web applications, this virtual machine was used to host the application for
the purposes of this experiment using VirtualBox – a program designed to manage and
operate virtual machines. The following is a small list of some of the vulnerabilities it
contains:
•

SQL Injection

•

File Upload Vulnerabilities

Figure 13 - Screenshot of OWASP Bricks

3.3.3.10 OWASP Rails Goat
RailsGoat is a vulnerable version of the Ruby on Rails Framework. It includes
vulnerabilities from the OWASP Top 10. This project is designed to educate both
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developers, as well as security professionals. This application is one of many included
in the OWASP Broken Web Application virtual machine, a UNIX based operating
system hosting a number of vulnerable web applications, this virtual machine was used
to host the application for the purposes of this experiment using VirtualBox – a
program designed to manage and operate virtual machines. Some of the vulnerabilities
included are:
•

SQL Injection

•

OS Command Injection

•

Cross-Site Scripting

•

Broken Authentication

•

Missing Access Controls

•

Insecure Direct Object Reference

•

Cross-Site Request Forgery

•

Invalidated Redirects

Figure 14 - Screenshot of OWASP Rails Goat

3.3.3.11 OWASP Vicnum
OWASP Vicnum is a project containing different vulnerable web applications based
on games commonly used to waste time. These applications demonstrate common web
security problems such as Cross-Site Scripting, SQL Injections, and Session
Management issues. This application is one of many included in the OWASP Broken
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Web Application virtual machine, a UNIX based operating system hosting a number of
vulnerable web applications, this virtual machine was used to host the application for
the purposes of this experiment using VirtualBox – a program designed to manage and
operate virtual machines.

Figure 15 - Screenshot of OWASP Vicnum

3.3.3.12 OWASP WebGoat.NET
OWASP WebGoat.NET is a deliberately vulnerable asp.net, designed for use in
classroom environments. This application is one of many included in the OWASP
Broken Web Application virtual machine, a UNIX based operating system hosting a
number of vulnerable web applications, this virtual machine was used to host the
application for the purposes of this experiment using VirtualBox – a program designed
to manage and operate virtual machines. The vulnerabilities included in it are:
•

SQL Injection

•

Cross-Site Scripting

•

Broken Authentication

•

Broken Access Controls

•

Cross-Site Request Forgery

•

Session Management, and many others
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Figure 16 - Screenshot of OWASP WebGoat.NET

3.3.3.13 WackoPicko
WackoPicko is a vulnerable web application written by Adam Doupé for use in his
2010 paper Why Johnny Can't Pentest: An Analysis of Black-box Web Vulnerability
Scanners. This application is one of many included in the OWASP Broken Web
Application virtual machine, a UNIX based operating system hosting a number of
vulnerable web applications, this virtual machine was used to host the application for
the purposes of this experiment using VirtualBox – a program designed to manage and
operate virtual machines. Some of the vulnerabilities it includes are:
•

Cross-Site Scripting

•

SQL Injection

•

OS Command Injection

•

Directory Traversal

•

File Inclusion
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Figure 17 - Screenshot of WackoPicko

3.3.3.14 BodgeIt

Figure 18 - Screenshot of BodgeIt

BodgeIt is a vulnerable web application, designed for those that are new to web
application security, and want to learn about exploiting vulnerabilities. This
application is one of many included in the OWASP Broken Web Application virtual
machine, a UNIX based operating system hosting a number of vulnerable web
applications, this virtual machine was used to host the application for the purposes of
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this experiment using VirtualBox – a program designed to manage and operate virtual
machines. It includes a few of the common vulnerabilities, including:
•

Cross-Site Scripting

•

SQL Injection

•

Cross-Site Request Forgery

•

Insecure Direct Object References

•

Application Logic Vulnerabilities

3.3.3.1 OWASP AppSensor Demo Application
The OWASP AppSensor Demo Application was designed to demonstrate the OWASP
AppSensor project, which defines a framework that offers guidance on implementing
intrusion detection and automated response into an existing application. This
application is one of many included in the OWASP Broken Web Application virtual
machine, a UNIX based operating system hosting a number of vulnerable web
applications, this virtual machine was used to host the application for the purposes of
this experiment using VirtualBox – a program designed to manage and operate virtual
machines.

Figure 19 - Screenshot of OWASP AppSensor Demo Application
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3.4 Experiment Detail
Figure 19 below shows a brief outline of the experiment which took place. There are
eight stages to the experiment that was performed; each of these stages will be
described in detail below.

Figure 20 - Diagram showing the experiment which took place

First Stage
The first of the experiment was to create a web application scanner – a program that
would check a web application for vulnerabilities. This web application scanner would
focus on detecting broken access control issues. Similarly in their 2016 paper (Near &
Jackson, 2016) Finding Security Bugs in Web Applications using a Catalogue of
Access Control Pattern, the authors developed a program they called SPACE –
Security Pattern CheckEr, an automated program for detecting access control issues in
web applications. However, SPACE has a significant flaw when considering it as a
program for widespread testing of security issues as; it requires access to the source
code, and for the developers to provide a mapping from the application to the
catalogue types – which it tests against. This is unfeasible when considered for testing
on a larger scale, due to two main factors, one: that the personnel performing a security
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review of the web application would have access to the source code – most security
reviews take place in a black box environment, i.e. without knowledge of the
underlying infrastructure. Two: that the personnel would then have enough knowledge
of the application to provide the mapping.
The web application scanner that was developed for this experiment however, requires
no knowledge of the application source code. This scanner is comprised of two
technologies which have been discussed above; python – the language used to develop
the scanner, and selenium – designed to automate browsers. The user will still need to
supply some information before running the program against a web application,
however this information is easy to obtain, and does not require any knowledge of
back end infrastructure. An xml file, containing the selenium instructions on logging
into the application as a user, is all the application will need before it can be run
against the web application.

Second Stage
The second stage of the experiment was to run the scanner developed in the previous
stage against web applications with known vulnerabilities. The web applications
chosen for this stage are purposely designed to be vulnerable, in order to instruct the
users on web application security and vulnerability detection. The chosen vulnerable
web applications include Pentester Lab 2, OWASP WebGoat, HacMe Bank, and
others.
Similarly in their 2012 paper (Buchler, Oudinet, & Pretschner, 2012) Semi-Automatic
Security Testing of Web Applications from a Secure Model, the authors tested their
model against WebGoat, and were able to successfully detect a role based access
control vulnerability. Also in their 2010 paper (Doupé, Cova, & Vigna, 2010) Why
Johnny Can’t Pentest: An Analysis of Black-box Web Vulnerability Scanners, the
authors developed a vulnerable application called WackoPicko, in order to test the web
vulnerability scanners they were using in their experiment.

Third Stage
The third stage of the experiment was to run the scanner against web apps in the public
domain. To achieve this twenty authenticated web applications were chosen at random.
Prior to the start of the experiment it was unknown as to whether or not these
applications had broken access control. The pool which the web applications will be
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drawn from contains web applications belonging to a wide variety of businesses,
ranging from eSports to venture capital firms. The owners of the twenty web
applications were contacted prior to the beginning of this stage, and permission was
granted to perform the testing required as part of the experiment, with the provision
that they be alerted to potential vulnerabilities, and that the returned results are
anonymous.

Fourth Stage
The fourth stage of the experiment was to manually validate the results of the previous
two stages. This manual validation would be performed by a group of four full time
information security consultants. The manual validation will be done by examining the
returned results to identify the locations of the detected authorisation vulnerabilities,
followed by an attempt to exploit these detected vulnerabilities. The exploitation of
these vulnerabilities will only proceed as far as necessary to confidently state that a
vulnerability exists in the detected location. This stage will show how accurately the
developed scanner has detected web application vulnerabilities.
The authors of the two papers mentioned above in stage two, chose to perform the
experiment with web applications that were specifically designed to be vulnerable.
However while that may be good enough to prove that they can detect vulnerabilities,
many of which are simple in their execution, a truer test would be to compare the
results from the vulnerable websites to those of websites that may not have
vulnerabilities. One of the issues with web application vulnerability scanners occurs
when the scanner believes it has detected vulnerability, when in truth it has detected a
false positive.
By comparing the results of web applications with known vulnerabilities, with the
results of web applications that may or may not have the vulnerabilities, a greater
awareness of potential false positives returned by the scanner may be gained.

Fifth Stage
The fifth stage was to repeat the second stage tests, but this time instead of the custom
developed scanner, the plug-ins for the commercial tool will be used. These plug-ins as
detailed above, are AuthMatrix, Authz, and Authorize. The web applications chosen
for this will be the same as those used in the second stage.
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The reason the same web applications will be used again for the commercial tool, is for
an accurate analysis of whether the custom written scanner or the plug-ins are more
accurate in the detection of authorisation vulnerabilities.

Sixth Stage
The fifth stage was to repeat the third stage tests, but this time instead of the custom
developed scanner, the plug-ins for the commercial tool will be used. These plug-ins as
detailed above, are AuthMatrix, Authz, and Authorize. The web applications chosen
for this will be the same as those used in the third stage.

Seventh Stage
The fourth stage of the experiment was to manually validate the results of the previous
two stages. This manual validation would be performed by a group of three or four full
time information security consultants. This stage will show how accurately the
commercial tool has detected web application vulnerabilities.

Eight Stage
The eight stage will be where the results of the developed scanner, and the results of
the commercial tool, are compared to determine which is more accurate at detecting
authorisation/broken access control issues.

3.5 Conclusion
This chapter examined the design of the experiment which took place, covering the
following topics: experiment overview, technologies used, and experiment detail.
There was a brief overview of what the experiment would entail, a brief description of
the technologies involved in the experiment – including the technologies for the
custom written scanner, the commercial tool and its plug-ins, and the vulnerable web
applications which were tested as part of the experiment. There was also a breakdown
of the details of the experiment, detailing the stages, and how it will be performed.

56

4. IMPLEMENTATION AND RESULTS
4.1 Introduction
Following on from the design of the experiment in the previous chapter, this chapter
will examine the implementation of the experiment and the results which were
gathered. It has been broken down into two sections, experiment implementation –
which will contain a description of the custom written scanner and detail how it works,
and a brief description of the public domain websites which were assessed as part of
the experiment. The second section, experiment results will contain the results from
each of the custom written scanner, and the commercial tool plug-ins.

4.2 Experiment Implementation
This section covers the implementation of the experiment, it provides details about
how the custom written scanner works, and discusses the public domain websites
which were tested.
4.2.1 Custom Written Scanner
The custom written scanner was developed using Python and the client API for
Selenium – which allowed the scanner to issue commands to a local instance of a
browser, in this case Firefox was used. However there is no difference between what
browsers are used for with the scanner, the only difference being what driver is present
on the machine on which the scanner is running.
The scanner begins by requesting for the user to provide the base URL of the
application to be tested, and one of more xml files containing the Selenium instructions
on logging into the application. A check is performed initially to determine whether
the user has supplied one or more xml files, if one xml file has been supplied the
scanner will then check for direct browsing authentication vulnerabilities – accessing
pages and functionality that only an authenticated user has access to while
unauthenticated, however it two xml files have been supplied the scanner will then
check for broken access controls otherwise known as authorisation vulnerabilities.
The program then parses through the xml Selenium commands, and builds a map of
how to log into the application which it then follows. Once the application has
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successfully authenticated, the program retrieves all the links on the home page,
storing them in a list, to from a site map of the application. This list is then iterated
through, visiting each URL in the list, and retrieving all the URLs on the page again –
but only adding them to the site map if they aren’t present already in the site map.
Once a full site map has been built, the program then opens a new browser instance
and repeats the process with the second set of login instructions, or if only one xml file
was entered, it will proceed with the same steps but will no authenticate to the
application first.
Once the two site maps are finished, the program then compares them to determine
which URLs are present in both, and which are only present in one of the site maps. A
new list is then formed of the URLs which are only present in one of the site maps,
along with the details of which user session the URL was found in.
The program will then run through the new list, and attempt to access each of the
URLs listed, in the open browser instance associated with the user that did not have
access. If the URL is accessible in both browser instances, then it’s reported to the
user, otherwise the program will move onto the next URL.
4.2.2 Public Domain Websites
As part of the experiment, it was necessary to test a number of public domain websites,
in order to use them as the actual experiment details. The vulnerable web applications
described in the previous chapter were used as two control groups, one; to determine if
the custom written scanner and the commercial tool plug-ins detected authorisation
vulnerabilities when they existed on the application, and two; to determine if the
custom written scanner and the commercial tool plug-ins would not detect
authorisation vulnerabilities when they did not exist in the application.

Along with these two groups it was necessary in order to gain, an accurate assessment
of both the custom written scanner and the commercial tool plug-ins, and in an effort
to avoid bias, to assess a third control group where it was unknown whether or not the
applications contained authorisation vulnerabilities.
The public domain websites chosen were selected from a pool of ten thousand public
domain web applications, with the application owner’s permission sought and gained
before any testing of the web applications took place. This pool of ten thousand public
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domain web applications included applications that ranged in purpose and technology,
from electronic sports – commonly known as eSports are a form of competitions using
video games - websites to online banking web applications, from online shops and
power company websites to state broadcaster websites.

The twenty web applications that were chosen at random provided what could be
considered a slice of life examination of web applications that are in the public
domain. They reflected both web applications which the normal internet user may
come across on a regular basis, as well as specialised web applications which only
certain types of internet users would come across. These twenty web applications
included:
•

A mobile phone application marketing campaign web application – this web
application allows the users to create and examine the results of a marketing
campaign to be pushed to mobile applications,

•

A forum website,

•

A document storage web application,

•

Two online gambling websites,

•

A medical trial study investigator portal web application – this web application
allows those organising a medical trial to examine and investigate those
participating in the trial,

•

An online merchandise shop,

•

An online grocery shop,

•

A website designer web application,

•

An insurance broker website,

•

Two power company websites,

•

A web application to allow users remote access to a corporate network,

•

A site inspection website – this web application allowed for the tracking of
health and safety inspections of workplaces,

•

A job listing website,

•

A secure file transfer website,

•

A corporate security training website,

•

An insurance service website,
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•

A peer to peer lending website – this web application allows users to post loan
applications and allows other users to crowd fund the loan, and

•

A tax services accountants’ website.

4.3 Experiment Results
This section details the results of the experiment that was performed, separating the
results between the vulnerable web applications, and the public domain web
applications. These results are further broken down for each of the custom written
scanner, and the commercial tool plug-ins. It should be noted that the numbers
displayed in the tables below reflect overall instances of vulnerabilities, rather than
each individual instance of broken authorisation or broken access control. What this
means is that in the example of a banking web application, if all the users are able to
view the account information of the other users, then this has been counted as a single
occurrence of the vulnerability, rather than as separate vulnerabilities, one for each of
the users.
4.3.1 Results from Vulnerable Web Applications
The following table shows the overall results received when testing using both the
custom written scanner, and the commercial tool plug-ins to test the vulnerable web
applications that were described in the previous chapter. These results include those of
two of the control groups of the experiment, the applications that are known to contain
broken access controls or authorisation vulnerabilities, and the applications where it is
known that they don’t contain broken access controls or authorisation vulnerabilities.
The results have been broken down into four values: total vulnerabilities – this number
shows the total amount of authorisation vulnerabilities that were detected in the
application, false negatives – this number shows the total amount of authorisation
vulnerabilities that exist in the web application which were missed by one or more of
the scanning tools, false positives – this number shows the total amount of detected
authorisation vulnerabilities which were found to be non-existent after manual
validation by a group of security experts, and real vulnerabilities – this number shows
the total amount of detected authorisation vulnerabilities which were found to be valid
issues by a group of security experts.
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Total

False

False

Real

Application Name

Detected

Negatives

Positives

Vulnerabilities

HacMe Bank

3

3

0

3

OWASP WebGoat

0

2

0

2

OWASP Juice Shop

0

1

0

1

Pentester Lab 2

1

2

0

3

App

0

0

0

0

Bwapp

0

1

0

1

Altoro Mutual

0

0

0

0

Mutillidae 2

0

1

0

1

OWASP Bricks

0

0

0

0

OWASP Rails Goat

1

0

0

1

OWASP Vicnum

0

0

0

0

OWASP WebGoat.NET 0

0

0

0

WackoPicko

0

0

0

0

BodgeIt

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

1

Damn Vulnerable Web

OWASP

AppSensor

Demo Application

Table 1 – Total Vulnerabilities detected in Vulnerable Web Applications by all three
scanning tools

As can be seen in Table 1, there were no false positives detected by any of the
scanning tools, when they were used to test each of the web applications for broken
access controls or authorisation vulnerabilities. There was however a number of false
negatives found, these occurred where there was no direct link to the vulnerable
functionality in the application, instead the user needed to guess the URL in order to
gain access.

The following table shows the overall results received when testing using the custom
written scanner, and the commercial tool plug-ins. The results have been broken down
into each of the commercial tool plug-ins, and the custom written scanner.
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Application Name

AuthMatrix

Authz

Authorize

Custom Script

HacMe Bank

3

3

3

0

OWASP WebGoat

0

0

0

0

OWASP Juice Shop

0

0

0

0

Pentester Lab 2

1

1

1

1

Damn Vulnerable Web App

0

0

0

0

Bwapp

0

0

0

0

Altoro Mutual

0

0

0

0

Mutillidae 2

0

0

0

0

OWASP Bricks

0

0

0

0

OWASP Rails Goat

1

1

1

1

OWASP Vicnum

0

0

0

0

OWASP WebGoat.NET

0

0

0

0

WackoPicko

0

0

0

0

BodgeIt

0

0

0

0

1

1

1

1

OWASP
Application

AppSensor

Demo

Table 2 - Vulnerabilities detected by each of the technologies

As can be seen in Table 2 above the custom script was at par with the three
commercial tool plug-ins for each of the applications bar one. The web application in
question is HacMe Bank, which uses JavaScript for navigation. This will be discussed
more in the next chapter in the scanning tools evaluation.

4.3.2 Results from Public Domain Web Applications
The following table shows the overall results received when testing using both the
custom written scanner and the commercial tool plug-ins. This table shows the results
of received after testing the third control group, the applications where it is unknown
whether or not they contain broken access controls or authorisation vulnerabilities. The
results have been broken down in the same manner as those of Table 1.
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Total

False

False

Real

Detected

Negatives

Positives

Vulnerabilities

marketing campaign app

3

3

0

3

Forum website

1

0

1

0

Document storage app

2

0

0

2

Betting Website

1

0

0

1

2

0

0

2

shop

3

0

0

3

Online grocery shop

2

0

0

2

Website designer

2

0

1

1

Betting Website

1

0

1

0

Insurance Broker Site

1

0

0

1

Website

2

0

0

2

Remote Access Website

0

0

0

0

Site Inspection Website

3

0

1

2

Job Listing Website

2

0

0

2

Website

0

0

0

0

Secure File Transfer

0

0

0

0

Training Website

1

0

0

1

Insurance Service Site

2

0

1

1

Website

1

0

0

1

Tax Services Website

2

1

0

2

Application Name
Mobile

Medical

phone

Trial

app

Study

Investigator Portal
Online

merchandising

Power

Power

Corporate

Company

Company

Security

Peer to Peer Lending

Table 3 - Total Vulnerabilities detected in Public Domain Web Applications by all three
scanning tools

As can be seen in Table 3 there were a number of false positives and false negatives
found when testing the public domain web applications. The majority of false
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negatives were found in the mobile phone application marketing campaign application,
on reviewing the results from this application it was noted that the application uses
what’s known as anti-CSRF tokens as headers, and as so some of the scanning tools
were unable to detect any vulnerabilities. This will be discussed more in the next
chapter in the scanning tools evaluation.

The following table shows the overall results received when testing using the custom
written scanner, and the commercial tool plug-ins. The results have been broken down
into each of the commercial tool plug-ins, and the custom written scanner.
Application Name

AuthMatrix

Authz

Authorize

Custom Script

campaign app

0

2

0

3

Forum website

0

1

0

0

Document storage app

2

2

2

2

Betting Website

1

1

1

1

Portal

2

2

2

2

Online merchandising shop

3

3

3

3

Online grocery shop

2

2

2

2

Website designer

1

2

1

1

Betting Website

0

1

0

0

Insurance Broker Site

1

1

1

1

Power Company Website

2

1

2

2

Remote Access Website

0

0

0

0

Site Inspection Website

2

3

3

2

Job Listing Website

2

2

2

2

Power Company Website

0

0

0

0

Secure File Transfer

0

0

0

0

Corporate Security Training Website

1

1

1

1

Insurance Service Site

1

2

2

1

Peer to Peer Lending Website

1

1

1

1

Tax Services Website

2

1

2

2

Mobile

Medical

phone

Trial

app

Study

marketing

Investigator

Table 4 - Vulnerabilities detected by each of the technologies
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As can be seen in Table 4 the custom script was again on par with the commercial tool
plug-ins, and in some cases it performed better, notably in the case of the Mobile
phone application marketing campaign application.

4.3 Conclusion
This chapter examined the implementation of the experiment and the results which
were gathered. It was broken down into two sections, experiment implementation –
which contained a description of the custom written scanner and details about how it
works, and a brief description of the public domain websites which were assessed as
part of the experiment. The second section, experiment results contained the results
from each of the custom written scanner, and the commercial tool plug-ins.
It was found through the results of each of the scanning tools, that the custom script
and AuthMatrix were the most accurate scanning tools with eighty-three percent
accuracy, while Authorize was found to be eighty percent accurate, and Authz was
found to only be sixty-six percent accurate.
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5. ANALYSIS, EVALUATION, AND DISCUSSION
5.1 Introduction
Following on from the previous chapter wherein the implementation of the experiment
was detailed, and the results from the experiment were provided, this chapter will
discuss the results and the experiment itself. It has been broken down into two parts:
the first part technologies evaluation will evaluate and discuss the two main
technologies used in the experiment, the custom written scanner, and the commercial
tool plug-ins. It will detail any strengths and limitations of these technologies as they
were noted during the course of the experiment.
The second part, results evaluation, will evaluate and discuss the results received over
the course of the experiment. This has also been split into two parts: the first focuses
on the results derived from the vulnerable web applications, while the second part
focuses on the results derived from the public domain web applications.

5.2 Technologies Evaluation
This section focuses on the evaluation of both the custom written scanner, and the
commercial tool plug-ins, in regards to their strengths and weaknesses, as noted during
the course of the experiment.
5.2.1 Custom Written Scanner
The custom written scanner that was developed as part of the experiment was able to
accurately detect authorisation vulnerabilities without reporting any false positives,
with a minimum of false negatives. There was only one application which was tested
that the custom written scanner reported false negatives, that is where the custom
written scanner missed real vulnerabilities. This application was called HacMe Bank,
and it used JavaScript for navigation. Out of a total of thirty-five applications which
were tested, the custom written scanner was able to find the correct number of
authorisation vulnerabilities in twenty-nine of web applications tested, resulting in an
accuracy of eighty-three percent. There were some strengths and limitations noted over
the course of the experiment, as detailed below.
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Strengths
The following strengths were noted during use of the custom written scanner over the
course of the experiment:
•

The custom written scanner was easy to use, with the user only needing to enter
the base URL of the application, and specify the file containing the login
instructions.

•

The custom written scanner is able to handle requests from the application
which include CSRF tokens in either the header or in the request body.

•

The custom written scanner handles the session for each user automatically,
allowing the user to “point and click” regarding testing of a web application.

Limitations
The following limitations were noted during use of the custom written scanner over the
course of the experiment:
•

During the crawling phase, where the scanner builds up the site maps of the
application, the custom written scanner was unable to successfully parse links
which use JavaScript. The scanner looks for all the URLs that are listed on a
page in the application, and uses these URLs to build up the site map, this is the
way that most web application scanners both commercially developed or
otherwise builds a site map for a web application. However if the application
uses JavaScript for navigation, then there are no URLs for the scanner to parse.
One possible way of resolving this issue, would be to force the custom scanner
to open any links that use JavaScript in a new tab or window, and check the
whether the URL is of the same format that is expected for the application.
However this would require the complete rewriting of the crawling
functionality in the custom scanner, and due to time constraints this was unable
to be implemented.

5.2.2 Commercial Tool Plug -ins
5.2.2.1 AuthMatrix
The AuthMatrix plug-in for Burp Suite, which was used to test web applications as
part of the experiment was able to accurately detect authorisation vulnerabilities
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without reporting any false positives, with a minimum of false negatives. Out of a total
of thirty-five applications which were tested, AuthMatrix was able to find the correct
number of authorisation vulnerabilities in twenty-nine of web applications tested,
resulting in an accuracy of eighty-three percent. There were some strengths and
limitations noted over the course of the experiment, as detailed below.

Strengths
The following strengths were noted during use of the AuthMatrix plug-in for Burp
Suite over the course of the experiment:
•

AuthMatrix had an easy to use and intuitive GUI

Limitations
The following limitations were noted during use of the AuthMatrix plug-in for Burp
Suite over the course of the experiment:
•

AuthMatrix is unable to handle requests from the application which include
CSRF tokens in either the header or in the request body.

•

AuthMatrix requires the user to build up a matrix of all the requests and user
types of the target application, before testing can begin.

•

AuthMatrix requires the user to keep two different user sessions active for the
duration of the tests necessitating the use of two different browsers.

•

AuthMatrix has no web application crawling functionality, instead it relies on
the tester to manually build the target application site map, and send requests to
AuthMatrix for testing.

5.2.2.2 Authz
The Authz plug-in for Burp Suite, which was used to test web applications as part of
the experiment was unable to accurately detect authorisation vulnerabilities without
reporting any false positives, and also reporting a number of false negatives. As noted
in the results in the previous chapter, there were several instances where Authz
reported an authorisation vulnerability, which after manual validation by a group of
security experts was shown to be a false positive. Out of a total of thirty-five
applications which were tested, Authz was able to find the correct number of
authorisation vulnerabilities in twenty-three of web applications tested, resulting in an
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accuracy of sixty-six percent. There were some strengths and limitations noted over the
course of the experiment, as detailed below.

Strengths
The following strengths were noted during use of the Authz plug-in for Burp Suite
over the course of the experiment:
•

Authz is able to handle requests from the application which include CSRF
tokens in either the header or in the request body.

Limitations
The following limitations were noted during use of the Authz plug-in for Burp Suite
over the course of the experiment:
•

Authz is able to handle requests from the application which include CSRF
tokens in either the header or in the request body.

•

Authz has no web application crawling functionality, instead it relies on the
tester to manually build the target application site map, and send requests to
Authz for testing.

•

Authz requires the user to keep two different user sessions active for the
duration of the tests necessitating the use of two different browsers.

5.2.2.3 Authorize
The Authorize plug-in for Burp Suite, which was used to test web applications as part
of the experiment was able to accurately detect authorisation vulnerabilities without
reporting any false positives, with a minimum of false negatives. Out of a total of
thirty-five applications which were tested, Authorize was able to find the correct
number of authorisation vulnerabilities in twenty-eight of web applications tested,
resulting in an accuracy of eighty-three percent. There were some strengths and
limitations noted over the course of the experiment, as detailed below.

Strengths
The following strengths were noted during use of the Authorize plug-in for Burp Suite
over the course of the experiment:
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•

Authorize has no web application crawling functionality, instead once the user
activates the plug-in Authorize then passively monitors the Burp Suite proxy,
and repeats all the requests with the different user specified session tokens.

Limitations
The following limitations were noted during use of the Authorize plug-in for Burp
Suite over the course of the experiment:
•

Authorize is unable to handle requests from the application which include
CSRF tokens in either the header or in the request body.

•

Authorize requires the user to keep two different user sessions active for the
duration of the tests, usually through the use of two different browsers.

•

Authorize requires the user to specify a string that indicates that proper access
controls are in place, however if the wrong string is used, this can lead to false
positives

5.2.3 Technologies Evaluation Summation
The following table summarises the evaluation of the technologies that were detailed
above, detailing the relative strengths and weaknesses that were found between the
custom developed scanner, and the three commercial tool plug-ins. It has been divided
into six categories:
•

Crawler – this category details how the crawling of the scanning tool is
handled, whether it is automated, or performed manually by the user

•

JavaScript – this category details whether or not the tool was able to handle
navigation which uses JavaScript

•

Anti-CSRF Tokens – this category details whether or not the tool was able to
handle applications which send anti-CSRF tokens as part of the request body,
or in the headers

•

Sessions – this category details how the tool handles sessions, whether it is
performed by the tool itself, or performed manually by the user

•

GUI – this category details whether or not the tool had a GUI

•

Ease of Use – this category details how easy it was to use the scanning tool
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Tool

Crawler

JavaScript Anti-

Sessions GUI Ease of Use

CSRF
Tokens
AuthMatrix Manual

Yes

No

User

Yes

User required to
build user matrix
before beginning

Authz

Manual

Yes

Yes

User

Yes

User required to
manually

send

each request
Authorize

Manual

Yes

No

User

Yes

User required to
provide tool with
string
no

denoting
access

to

restricted
functionality
Custom

Automated No

Yes

Tool

Script

No

User required to
provide
file

XML

containing

login
instructions, and
base URL
Table 5 - Comparison of Scanning Tools

5.3 Results Evaluation
This section focuses on the evaluation of the results derived over the course of the
experiment from the custom written scanner, and the commercial tool plug-ins, in
regards to detected authorisation vulnerabilities in the tested applications.
5.3.1 Results from Vulnerable Web Applications
Figure 20 as seen below shows the comparison of total vulnerabilities found in each of
the vulnerable web applications that were tested prior to the experiment, broken down
into total vulnerabilities – this number shows the total amount of authorisation
vulnerabilities that were detected in the application, false positives – this number
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shows the total amount of detected authorisation vulnerabilities which were found to
be non-existent after manual validation by a group of security experts, and real
vulnerabilities – this number shows the total amount of detected authorisation
vulnerabilities which were found to be valid issues by a group of security experts.
These applications were tested by a group of web application security experts before
the experiment occurred, in order to determine how much vulnerabilities each
application contained – this could be done since those applications with vulnerabilities
were purposely designed that way, and so the amount of vulnerabilities contained in
each application could easily be determined.
OWASP AppSensor Demo Application
BodgeIt
WackoPicko
OWASP WebGoat.NET

OWASP Vicnum
OWASP Rails Goat
Real Vulnerabilities

Owasp Bricks

False Positives

Mutillidae 2
Altoro Mutual

False Negatives

Bwapp

Total Detected

Damn Vulnerable Web App
Pentester Lab 2
OWASP Juice Shop
OWASP WebGoat
HacMe Bank
0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

Figure 21 - Comparison of Vulnerabilities found in Vulnerable Web Applications

As can be seen in Figure 21, eight of the vulnerable web applications tested contained
broken access controls or authorisation vulnerabilities. However when the web
applications were tested using the custom written scanner and the commercial tool
plug-ins only four of the vulnerable web applications were found to contain broken
access controls or authorisation vulnerabilities, as can be seen in figure 22. Another
point of interest is that in figure 22 there was only one broken access control or
authorisation vulnerability detected by each of the scanning tools, however in figure 21
there were three issues detected.
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Custom Script

Figure 22 - Comparison of Vulnerabilities found in each vulnerable web application
broken down by scanning tool

The disparities between these two figures have a simple explanation, each of these
vulnerable web applications contain a vulnerability wherein the user can directly
browse to administrator functionality, through the use of appending a string to the
URL. The scanning tools used during the experiment work, in essence, by using two
different user accounts, and comparing the site maps in the case of the custom written
scanner, and by replaying requests associated with each role in the case of the
commercial tool plug-ins.
Another interesting point is that in one of the vulnerable web applications HacMe
Bank, the commercial tool plug-ins all found three vulnerabilities, while the custom
written scanner did not find any. The reasoning behind this however has already been
touched upon in the evaluation of the custom written scanner, as the application uses
JavaScript for navigation and the custom written scanner is unable to crawl a website
that uses JavaScript for navigation.
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5.3.2 Results from Public Domain Web Applications
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0
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1
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Figure 23 - Comparison of Vulnerabilities found in Public Domain Web Applications

Figure 22 as shown above displays a comparison of total vulnerabilities found in each
of the public domain web applications that were tested during the experiment, broken
down into total vulnerabilities – this number shows the total amount of broken access
controls or authorisation vulnerabilities that were detected in the application, false
positives – this number shows the total amount of detected broken access controls or
authorisation vulnerabilities which were found to be non-existent after manual
validation by a group of security experts, and real vulnerabilities – this number shows
the total amount of detected broken access controls or authorisation vulnerabilities
which were found to be valid issues by a group of security experts. The interesting
point to note here is that out of the twenty web applications tested fifteen contained
broken access controls or authorisation vulnerabilities; this means that seventy-five
percent of the tested applications contained these vulnerabilities. Another interesting
point that can be found in figure 22, is that five of the applications where broken
access controls or authorisation vulnerabilities were detected, contained false positive
findings, with two of these applications being found to contain no broken access
controls or authorisation vulnerabilities after being tested by a group of computer
security experts, in other words forty percent of the times false positives were detected
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the web applications contained no broken access controls or authorisation
vulnerabilities.
3
2.5
2
1.5
1
AuthMatrix
0.5

Tax Services Website

Peer to Peer Lending Website

Insurance Service Site

Corporate Security Training…

Secure File Transfer

Power Company Website

Job Listing Website

Site Inspection Website

Remote Access Website

Power Company Website

Insurance Broker Site

Betting Website

Website designer

Online grocery shop

Online merchandising shop

Medical Trial Study Investigator…

Betting Website

Document storage app

Forum website

Mobile phone app marketing…

0

Authz
Authorize
Custom Script

Figure 24 - Comparison of Vulnerabilities found in each public domain web application
broken down by scanning tool

These numbers have been further broken down in figure 23, showing how much of the
detected broken access controls or the authorisation vulnerabilities, were found by
each of the scanning tools. Of particular note here is that for each of the applications
where broken access controls or authorisation vulnerabilities were found, the custom
written scanner was successfully able to identify the issue, without any false positives.
One of the commercial tool plug-ins, AuthMatrix, was also able to successfully
identify broken access controls or authorisation vulnerabilities in the majority of the
applications. However, there was one application which AuthMatrix was unable to
detect any issues, that being the Mobile phone app marketing campaign app. The
reasoning behind this was touched upon in the evaluation of the commercial tool plugins, that being because the web application in question used anti-CSRF tokens in either
the body of the request or in the request headers. As the AuthMatrix and Authorize
plug-ins use session cookies when testing the application, neither of these were able to
detect any issue for that particular application.
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Another point of interest from these figures is that there is one commercial tool plug-in
which consistently returned false positives for applications whenever a false positive
was returned. This plug-in being Authz, with Authorize also returning some false
positives, however Authz returned a far greater portion of the false positives than
Authorize.
5.3.3 Comparison of custom written scanner and commercial tool
plug-ins

Comparison of Scanners relative to
real vulnerabilities - vulnerable web
applications
Custom Script

23%

77%

Authorize

46%

54%

Real Vulnerability
Percentage

Authz

46%

54%

AuthMatrix

46%

54%

Missed Vulnerability
Percentage

0%

20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 120%

Figure 25 - Comparison of Scanners relative to real vulnerabilities - vulnerable web
applications

The figure above shows the relative percentage of broken access controls or
authorisation vulnerabilities which each of the scanning tools detected in the
vulnerable web applications. Of note is that each of the commercial tool plug-ins
AuthMatrix, Authz, and Authorize found fifty percent of the intended vulnerabilities
while the custom written scanner only found twenty-five percent of the intended
vulnerabilities. This disparity has been touch upon above in both the technology
evaluation and the evaluation of the results from the vulnerable web applications.
However it will be restated here, the reason behind the disparity is that one of the
vulnerable web applications, which contained three instances of broken access controls
or authorisation vulnerabilities, and which accounts for twenty-five percent of the total
vulnerabilities across all the vulnerable web applications, uses JavaScript for
navigation. The custom written scanner is unable to navigate a web application which
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uses JavaScript, while the commercial tool plug-ins which requires the user to
manually build up the site map of the web application, and are unconcerned with
whether an application uses JavaScript for navigation.

However a difference can be seen, when the results of the public domain websites are
examined, as seen in figure 26. The custom written scanner performed better than the
commercial tool plug-ins, where one hundred percent of the broken access controls or
authorisation vulnerabilities it detected, were found to be real vulnerabilities after
manual validation by a group of computer security experts. This is compared to eightyeight percent for AuthMatrix, ninety-six percent for Authorize, and one hundred and
eight percent for Authz respectively – the percentage for Authz comes from the extra
volume of false positives which it detected compared to real vulnerabilities. The high
percentage of detected vulnerabilities for the Authz plug-in correlates to figure 27,
wherein the relative percentage of each scanning tool in regards to false positives is
shown. The Authz plug-in was found to have produced one hundred percent of the
false positives, while forty percent of these were also detected by the Authorize plugin. This is in contrast to the AuthMatrix plug-in and the custom written scanner, which
both found no false positives during the course of the experiment.
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Figure 26 - Comparison of Scanners relative to real vulnerabilities - public domain web
applications
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Comparison of Scanners relative to
False Positive Percentage - public
domain web applications
AuthMatrix
Authz
Authorize

Custom Script

Figure 27 - Comparison of Scanners relative to False Positive Percentage - public domain
web applications

Also of importance is to note how much broken access controls or authorisation
vulnerabilities each of the scanning tools examined missed over the course of the
experiment, this can be seen in figure 28. The three plug-ins for the commercial tool,
AuthMatrix, Authz, and Authorize, each missed twelve percent of the total number of
vulnerabilities, while the custom written scanner missed none.

Comparison of Scanners relative to
Missed Vulnerabilities - public
domain web applications
AuthMatrix
Authz
Authorize
Custom Script

Figure 28 - Comparison of Scanners relative to Missed Vulnerabilities - public domain
web applications
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5.4 Conclusion
This chapter examined and evaluated the results generated during the experiment. It
was broken down into two parts: first the technology evaluation, and second the results
evaluation.
The technology evaluation looked at the three commercial tool plug-ins, and the
custom written scanner. It examined the strengths and limitations of each of these
scanning tools, as they were noted during the experiment.
The results evaluation looked at the results generated from the testing of the vulnerable
web applications, and the public domain web applications. It examined the findings of
the scanning tools in regards to both vulnerable web applications, and the public
domain web applications which were tested over the course of the experiment. In
addition to this the performance of each of the scanning tools, were compared in terms
of real vulnerabilities detected, real vulnerabilities missed, and false positives detected.
It is also clear to see that although lacking in some areas, the custom written scanner,
provides an overall assessment of a target application that’s as accurate as the
commercial tool plug-ins in some regards, and in other regards is more accurate,
despite its limitations.
The recommend approach in light of the evaluation would be for multiple tools to be
used when attempting to automate the detection of these vulnerabilities, to validate the
findings of one tool, with those of another.
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6. CONCLUSION
6.1 Research Overview
The objective of this research was to examine whether the tests performed to test an
authenticated web application could be automated, in such a way that the person
performing a penetration test of the web application need not interact with the
automated tool beyond initiation, and monitoring for errors.

In the introduction chapter this was summarised by the following question.
Will a custom developed web application scanner, provide a more accurate analysis
than plug-ins developed for commercial grade software in the detection of
authorisation vulnerabilities?
In order to best approach this question, the research was broken down into four
avenues:
1. Identify other previous work in the this area, and determine whether there is a
potential avenue of experimentation, which has not been considered before
2. Use the identified plug-ins and the custom python script to identify potential
authorisation vulnerabilities in a group of website.
3. To manually validate the results of the tools, through the use of experts in the
field of web application security, in order to identify which of the results are
valid authorisation vulnerabilities, and which are in fact false positives.
4. To compare the manually validated results, in order to answer the question
stated above.

6.2 Experimentation Design, Results and Evaluation
6.2.1 Design
The experiment was broken down into the following eight stages:
1. To create the web application scanner
2. Run the web application scanner against web applications with known
vulnerabilities
3. Run the web application scanner against public domain web applications
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4. Have a group of computer security experts manually validate the results of the
previous two stages
5. Run the commercial tool plug-ins against web applications with known
vulnerabilities
6. Run the commercial tool plug-ins against public domain web applications
7. Have a group of computer security experts manually validate the results of the
previous two stages
8. Compare the results of the developed web application scanner, with those of
the commercial tool plug-ins
These eight stages were designed in order to best achieve the stated objective of the
experiment. The custom written scanner that was created as part of the first stage was
designed to minimise the effort the user needed to interact with the scanner in order to
test the application. In this way it contrasted with the commercial tool plug-ins which
required more user interaction in order to test the application.
6.2.2 Results
The results were split into two different categories: those that were derived from the
vulnerable web applications and those that were derived from the public domain web
applications. The vulnerable web applications were tested by a group of computer
security experts prior to the beginning of the experiment, this was done in order to
determine how many instances of broken access controls or authorisation
vulnerabilities were present in each of the applications, a figure needed when
comparing the results of the each individual scanning tool.
It was found through the results of each of the scanning tools, that the custom script
and AuthMatrix were the most accurate scanning tools with both detecting twenty-nine
vulnerabilities out of a maximum of thirty-nine giving them an overall result of
seventy-four percent accuracy, while Authorize was found to have detected twentyeight vulnerabilities out of a maximum of thirty-nine giving it an overall result of
seventy-two percent accuracy, while finally Authz was found to only be fifty-nine
percent accurate having only detected twenty-three out of a possible thirty-none
vulnerabilities.
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6.2.3 Evaluation
The results returned from the experiment were compared and evaluated based on the
total number of vulnerabilities, both real and false positive found in each of the
vulnerable web applications, and the public domain web applications. They were
further broken down and compared based on each of the scanning tools.
The scanning tools were also compared and evaluated based on the relative amount of
real vulnerabilities each tool detected, false positives each tool detected, and on the
number of vulnerabilities each tool didn’t detect but other tools did.
The discrepancies between the different scanning tools can be traced back to their
functionality. The custom scanning tool was unable to parse the URLs of web
applications which used JavaScript for navigation, while AuthMatrix and Authorize
were unable to detect vulnerabilities when the web applications used anti-CSRF tokens
in the request headers or bodies.
6.2.4 Limitations
There are some limitations to the experiment which were noted over the duration:
•

The experiment took place using fifteen vulnerable web applications, and
twenty public domain web applications.

•

All of the web applications tested used cookies as a means to manage sessions;
however some web applications do not use cookies for session management.

•

No application programming interfaces or APIs were tested as part of the
experiment

•

Due to time constraints each of the public domain web applications were only
tested once. This can have an effect on the results due to the possibility that
different URLs may be available on different occasions for each of the web
applications. For example, if the request for a URL timed out due the
experiment, the result would not necessarily be accurate.

6.3 Future Work and Recommendations
There are a number of possible suggestions for where future work in this area could
lead, or where additional experimentation could occur:
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Due to the increasing trend of using application programming interface or API back
ends to serve both web applications and mobile applications, APIs are becoming more
common, and so is the need for proper access controls on API back ends.
With the increasing popularity of APIs, and the growing concern over cookies tracking
users across multiple websites, there is a growing trend towards web applications that
don’t use cookies. The cookies can typically be replaced with a unique value in the
request header or body similar to the anti-CSRF tokens which were described earlier.

6.4 Final Conclusion
The objective of this research as stated above in the research overview was to examine
whether the tests performed to test an authenticated web application could be
automated, in such a way that the person performing a penetration test of the web
application need not interact with the automated tool beyond initiation, and monitoring
for errors.
It is clear that while there was some limitations noted during the evaluation of the
custom written scanner, that it is capable of matching and at time exceeding the
capabilities of the commercial tool plug-ins. However further work will need to be
done on the custom written scanner, in order to overcome the stated limitations.

83

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Afolaranmi, S. O., Ferrer, B. R., Mohammed, W. M., Lastra, J. L., Ahmad, M., &
Harrison, R. (2017). Providing an Access Control layer to Web-Based
Applications for the industrial domain. 2017 IEEE 15th International
Conference on Industrial Informatics (pp. 1096-1102). IEEE.
Almehmadi, A., & El-Khatib, K. (2013). Authorized! Access Denied, Unauthorized!
Access Granted . SIN'13 (pp. 363-367). Aksaray, Turkey: ACM.
Alqahtani, S., He, X., & Gamble, R. (2017). Adapting Compliance of Security
Requirements in Multi-Tenant Applications. 2017 IEEE 2nd International
Workshops on Foundations and Applications of Self* Systems (FAS*W) (pp.
122-129). IEEE.
Assad, R. E., Tarciana, K., Ferraz, F. S., Ferreira, L. P., & Meira, S. R. (2010).
Security Quality Assurance on Web-based Application Through Security
Requirements Tests. 2010 Fifth International Conference on Software
Engineering Advances (pp. 272-277). IEEE.
Bocic, I., & Bultan, T. (2016). Finding Access Control Bugs in Web Applications with
CanCheck. (pp. 155-166). Singapore: ACM.
Braz, F. A., Fernandez, E. B., & VanHilst, M. (2008). Eliciting Security Requirements
through Misuse Activities. 19th International Workshop on Database and
Expert Systems Application, 2008. DEXA '08. . Turin: IEEE.
Buchler, M., Oudinet, J., & Pretschner, A. (2012). Semi-Automatic Security Testing of
Web Applications from a Secure Model. IEEE (pp. 253-262). IEEE.
Creasey, J., & Glover, I. (2013). Penetration Test Procurement Buyers Guide. Great
Britain: CREST.
Doupé, A., Cova, M., & Vigna, G. (2010). Why Johnny Can’t Pentest:An Analysis of
Black-box Web Vulnerability Scanners. Santa Barbara: University of
California.
Gajanayake, R., Iannelle, R., & Sahama, T. (2011). Privacy by Information
Accountability for E-Health Systems. 2011 6th International Conference on
Industrial and Information Systems (pp. 49-53). Sri Lanka: IEEE.
Grobauer, B., Walloschek, T., & Stocker, E. (2010, June 17). Understanding Cloud
Computing Vulnerabilities. IEEE Security & Privacy, pp. 50-57.

84

Hardt, D. (2012, Octoer). The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework. Internet
Engineering Task Force.
Indu, I., & Rubesh Anand, P. M. (2016). Hybrid Authentication and Authorization
Model for Web based Applications . (pp. 1187-1191). IEEE.
Kagal, L., Finin, T., Paolucci, M., Srinivasan, N., Sycara, K., & Denker, G. (2004).
Authorisation and privacy for semantic web services. IEEE Intelligent Systems,
50-56.
Kumar, R. (2011). Mitigating the Authentication Vulnerabilities in Web Applications
through Security Requirements. 2011 World Congress on Information and
Communication Technologies (pp. 1294-1298). IEEE.
Kumar, R. (2015). Analysis of Key Critical Requirements for Enhancing Security of
Web

Applications

.

2015

International

Conference

on

Computers,

Communications, and Systems (pp. 241-245). IEEE.
Marinescu, P., Parry, C., Pomarole, M., Tian, Y., Tague, P., & Papagiannis, I. (2017).
IVD: Automatic Learning and Enforcement of Authorization Rules in Online
Social Networks. 2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (pp. 10941109). IEEE.
Muthukumaran, D., O'Keeffe, D., Priebe, C., Eyers, D., Shand, B., & Pietzuch, P.
(2015). FlowWatcher: Defending against Data Disclosure Vulnerabilities in
Web Applications . (pp. 603-615). Denver: ACM.
Near, J. P., & Jackson, D. (2016). Finding Security Bugs in Web Applications using a
Catalog of Access Control Patterns. 2016 IEEE/ACM 38th IEEE International
Conference on Software Engineering. Austin: IEEE.
Ni, Q., Bertino, E., Lobo, J., Brodie, C., Karat, C.-M., Karat, J., & Trombeta, A.
(2010). Privacy-aware role-based access control. ACM Transactions on
Information and System Security.
NIST. (2008, September). Technical Guide to Information Security Testing and
Assessment. Gaithersberg, U.S.A.: NIST.
Noseevich, G., & Petukhov, A. (2011). Detecting Insufficient Access Control in Web
Applications. SysSec Workshop (SysSec), 2011 First (pp. 11-18). Amsterdam,
Netherlands: IEEE.
Omotunde, H., & Ibrahim, R. (2016). A Hybrid Threat Model for Software Security
Requirement Specification . IEEE.

85

Pato, J., Paradesi, S., Jacobi, I., Shih, F., & Wang, S. (2011). Aintno: Demonstration of
Information Accountability on the Web. Privacy, Security, Risk and Trust
(PASSAT) and 2011 IEEE Third Inernational Conference on Social Computing
(SocialCom), 2011 IEEE Third International Conference on (pp. 1072-1081).
Boston: IEEE.
Schiffman, J., Zhang, X., & Gibbs, S. (2010). DAuth: Fine-grained Authorization
Delegation for Distributed Web Application Consumers. 2010 IEEE
International Symposium on Policies for Distributed Systems and Networks
(pp. 95-102). IEEE.
Shah, S., & Mehtre, B. M. (2014). An Automated Approach to Vulnerability
Assessment and Penetration Testing using Net-Nirikshak 1.0. 2014 IEEE
International

Conference

on

Advanced

Communication

Control

and

Computing Technologies (pp. 707-712). IEEE.
Singh, K. (2012). xAccess: A Unified User-Centric Access Control Framework for
Web Applications. 2012 IEEE Network Operations and Management
Symposium (NOMS): Short Papers (pp. 530-533). IEEE.
Srinivasan, M. K., Sarukesi, K., Rodrigues, P., M, S. M., & P, R. (2012). State-of-theart Cloud Computing Security Taxonomies - A classification of security
challenges in the present cloud computing environment. Chennai: ACM.
Stefinko, Y., Piskozub, A., & Banakh, R. (2016). Manual and Automated Penetration
Testing. Benefits and Drawbacks. Modern Tendency . Lviv-Slavske, Ukraine.
Stuttard, D., & Pinto, M. (2011). The Web Application Hackers Handbook Second
Edition. Indianpolis: John Wiley & Sons.
Thankachan, A., Ramakrishnan, R., & Kalaiarasi, M. (2014). A Survey and Vital
Analysis of Various State of the Art Solutions for Web Application Security.
Tamil Nadu: IEEE.
Tso, K. S., Pajevski, M. J., & Brian, J. (2011). Access Control of Web and Java Based
Applications. 2011 17th IEEE Pacific Rim International Symposium on
Dependable Computing (pp. 320-325). IEEE.
Verizon. (2017). 2017 Data Breach Investigations Report. Verizon.
Wasserman, G., Yu, D., Dhurjati, D., Inamura, H., & Su, Z. (2008). Dynamic test input
generation for web applicaitons. 08 Proceedings of the 2008 international
symposium on software testing and analysis (pp. 249-260). Seattle: ACM.

86

Weitzner, D. J., Abelson, H., Berners-Lee, T., Feigenbaum, J., Hendler, J., & Sussman,
G. J. (2007, June 13). Information Accountability. Cambridge, Massachussetts,
United States of America: Massachussetts Institute of Technology.
Wen, S., Xue, Y., Xu, J., Yang, H., Li, X., Song, W., & Si, G. (2016). Toward
Exploiting Access Control Vulnerabilities within MongoDB Backend Web
Applications . 2016 IEEE 40th Annual Computer Software and Applications
Conference (pp. 143-153). IEEE.
WhiteHat Security. (2017). Application Security Statistics Report. WhiteHat.
Zhao, J., Shang, W., Wan, M., & Zeng, P. (2015). Penetration Testing Automation
Assessment Method Based on Rule Tree. The 5th Annual IEEE International
Conference on Cyber Technology in Automation, Control and Intelligent
Systems (pp. 1829-1833). Shenyang: IEEE.

87

